Supreme Court Limits Scope of ADA Coverage

Corrective Measures Key to Whether Person is Disabled
Monocular Vision Is Not a “Per Se” Disability
Fewer People Covered by ADA; More Questions Raised

Three 1999 decisions by the Supreme Court clarify who is protected by the ADA. Although the decisions generally pleased employers because they limit the definition of disability, they provide only limited guidance on how to apply the law.

In the decisions, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The decisions, Sutton v. United Air Lines, No. 97-1943, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, No. 97-1992, and Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, No. 98-591, were issued on June 22, 1999, and focused primarily on what it means to be disabled under the ADA. The Court dealt a blow to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in the Sutton and Murphy cases by determining that “mitigating” or corrective measures (such as eye glasses and medication) must be considered in evaluating whether an individual is disabled. The EEOC’s position is that disabilities should be evaluated in their uncorrected, unmedicated state. In Albertsons, the Court found that monocular vision is not automatically considered a disability and that employers may rely on the standards of government agencies in excluding individuals from jobs. Although these cases represent victories for employers, they also underscore the complexities of the ADA and leave unanswered questions about the interpretation of the law.

In the two cases addressing the use of corrective measures, Sutton and Murphy, the Court addressed the question of whether a person with a medical condition that can be controlled by medication or other assistive device should be considered disabled under the ADA. The Sutton case involved twins who had severe myopia but had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses. They were rejected for global airline pilot positions because they did not meet the airline’s minimum requirement of uncorrected visual acuity. In the Murphy case, a mechanic/driver was fired because his blood pressure exceeded the levels established by Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, even though he took medication that allowed him to function normally in everyday activities.

The plaintiffs in both cases argued that they were discriminated against because of their disabilities or because they were regarded as disabled, even though their use of corrective devices or medication allowed them to function normally. They argued that whether they are disabled should be determined by looking at their impairments in their uncorrected states. Under the ADA, an individual is disabled if he has a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, has a record of an impairment, or is regarded as having an impairment. To support their position, they relied on interpretive guidance issued by the EEOC that requires individuals to be evaluated without regard to any mitigating measures they use, such as medicines or assistive or prosthetic devices. Rejecting the EEOC’s position, the Court held that corrective measures must be taken into account.

To support its conclusion, the Court looked at three elements of the ADA. First, it focused on the definition of disability that requires that an impairment “substantially limit” a major life activity. The Court reasoned that a disability exists only if an impairment currently substantially limits a major life activity, not if it might be substantially limiting if mitigating measures are not taken.

Second, the Court explained that the ADA requires that an asserted disability be evaluated on an individual basis, taking into account the effect of an impairment on a particular person. Thus, the Court concluded that the EEOC guidance, by ignoring mitigating measures, would create a system in which a class of people with a particular disease automatically would be considered disabled. As a result, anyone with that disease would be disabled regardless of whether he was actually substantially limited by that condition.

Third, the Court looked at the preamble of the ADA that indicates Congress intended the ADA to protect 43 million Americans who have one or more physical or mental disabilities. By relying on this number, the Court explained that Congress did not expect the ADA to cover the estimated 160 million people whose impairments are corrected by medications or other devices. Taking these three elements into consideration, the Court determined that the plaintiffs were not disabled under the ADA.

The Court also addressed whether the employers in these cases “regarded” the plaintiffs as disabled and, therefore, discriminated against them under the ADA by finding they were unable to work in the jobs at issue. A person may be regarded as having a disability if the employer mistakenly believes either that he has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. In these cases, the plaintiffs argued that the employers mistakenly believed that their physical impairments substantially limited them in the major life activity of working. The Court rejected this argument, holding that a person must be regarded as unable to perform a broad class of jobs, not simply a particular job as in the plaintiffs’ cases, to show he was regarded as disabled under the ADA.

In the third case, the Court addressed two narrow issues. The first was whether monocular vision is a disability under the ADA. The second was whether an employer that requires employees to meet a federal regulation in order to qualify for a job faces any restrictions or obligations if the regulation can be waived in an experimental DOT program. According to the case, the employee was erroneously hired as a driver even though he did not meet the DOT vision standard because he had monocular vision (vision in one eye). When the employer discovered the error two years later, it terminated him for failure to meet the standard, even though he was eligible to apply for a waiver of the standard under a DOT trial program implemented to determine if the vision standard could be lowered and still ensure public safety. The employee filed suit claiming the termination violated the ADA since he could perform the job using the DOT waiver.

The Court found for the employer, holding that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had incorrectly determined that monocular vision is always a disability. According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was flawed in three ways. First, the Ninth Circuit found that there was only a significant “difference” between the way the employee sees and the manner in which most people see. According to the Court, the lower court should have considered whether there was a significant “restriction” in the way he sees as required by the EEOC’s regulations to determine when a person is substantially limited in a major life activity. Second, the Ninth Circuit did not take into account the mitigating measure that a person with monocular vision may subconsciously compensate for the vision loss. Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not use the individualized analysis required by the ADA to determine whether the particular employee was indeed disabled. For these reasons, the Court found that the employee did not prove he was disabled under the ADA.

In addressing the employer’s reliance on the DOT’s vision standard to terminate the employee, the Court held that the employer did not have to justify the application of the standard just because it can be waived on an individual basis as part of an experimental program. The Court stated that the waiver program did not modify the visual acuity standards; rather, it was implemented only to determine whether the standards eventually should be changed. Since the waiver was nothing more than an experiment to collect data, the ADA could not be read to require employers to defend a decision not to participate in the experiment.

Several points can be taken from these three cases. First, these cases appear to be victories for employers because they limit who is protected by the ADA by allowing employers and courts to take into consideration any corrective measures or medications an individual is using in determining whether he is disabled. Thus, just because a person has diabetes that is controlled by medication, he is not disabled unless, while taking the medication, his impairment substantially limits his ability to perform a major life activity. Second, the decisions still leave employees who take medication or use assistive devices plenty of room to sue under other prongs of the ADA definition, particularly under the “regarded as” disabled category. Third, the decisions underscore the importance of using an individualized assessment to determine whether someone is disabled (taking into account the particular person’s condition, abilities, and limitations), rather than stereotypes regarding the effect of an impairment.

These cases also are significant for what they do not do. For example, they do not explain what is a reasonable accommodation or address how the “regarded as” disabled definition applies. In addition, although the Court indicated that the term “substantially limits” should be read in the present tense so that mitigating measures should be considered, it did not elaborate on what an employee has to show to prove he is substantially limited in a major life activity. Until the Court addresses these issues, employers and employees alike will have to rely on the EEOC’s complicated regulations and the many conflicting court cases addressing the ADA.

Information and analysis for this article were provided by attorneys from Vedder, Price, Kaufman, and Kammholz (www.vedderprice.com), Legal Editors to Personnel Policy Service.